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ABSTRACT Face morphing attack is proved to be a serious threat to the existing face recognition systems. 
Although a few face morphing detection methods have been put forward, the face morphing accomplice’s 
facial restoration remains a challenging problem. In this paper, a face de-morphing generative adversarial 
network (FD-GAN) is proposed to restore the accomplice’s facial image. It utilizes a symmetric dual network 
architecture and two levels of restoration losses to separate the identity feature of the morphing accomplice. 
By exploiting the captured facial image (containing the criminal’s identity) from the face recognition system 
and the morphed image stored in the e-passport system (containing both criminal and accomplice’s identities), 
the FD-GAN can effectively restore the accomplice’s facial image. Experimental results and analysis 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. It has great potential to be implemented for detecting 
the face morphing accomplice in a real identity verification scenario. 
INDEX TERMS Face de-morphing, face morphing attack, facial restoration, generative adversarial 
network 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the development of face biometrics, face recognition 
systems (FRS) with high accuracy are extensively used in 
our daily life. In real applications, a prevalently used FRS is 
Automatic Border Control (ABC) system. It can expediently 
verify a person’s identity with one’s electronic machine 
readable travel document (eMRTD) [1], which contains a 
facial reference image. In the past twelve years, more than 
800 million eMRTD instances have been issued, following 
the specifications from the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO). 
Recently, it was found that a novel identity theft scenario 
can easily spoof the FRS of ABC [2]. The idea of the attack is: 
a morphed facial image (a combination of two or more real 
facial images) is first generated, and it looks like multiple real 
persons (e.g. a criminal and an accomplice). Then the morphed 
image is enrolled as an identity template of the FRS. In a 
successful attack, both the criminal and the accomplice can 
match the template stored in the FRS. It means that a wanted 
criminal is able to obtain a legitimate e-passport or eMRTD 
 
FIGURE 1.  Example of the morphed images generated from two 
contributors. 
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by morphing his facial image with an accomplice. Some 
samples of the morphed facial images are shown in Figure 1. 
After this idea was put forward, some concerns about the 
vulnerability of commercial FRS with respect to morphed face 
attack have been investigated [3-7]. It was proved that face 
morphing attack is posing a serious threat to the existing FRS. 
To countermeasure this situation, some face morphing 
detection methods have been proposed to protect the security 
of FRS [8-16]. However, all of these methods only detected 
the presence of face morphing attack, the restoration of the 
accomplice’s facial image has not been seriously discussed. 
Recently, a face de-morphing method was proposed in [17]. 
It restored the facial image of the morphing accomplice by 
reversing the face morphing operation. Unfortunately, it needs 
the prior knowledge on the morphing parameters of the face 
morphing, which is impractical in real applications. 
Inspired by the popular use of generative adversarial 
networks (GAN) [18] in image synthesis, we consider the 
restoration of the accomplice’s facial image from a perspective 
of a learning-based generation. Different from the face de-
morphing by inverting the morphing process in [17], our goal 
is to obtain the accomplice’s identity information in the 
morphed facial image without the prior knowledge of 
morphed face generation. To accomplish this, FD-GAN is 
designed, and it utilizes a symmetric dual network architecture 
and two levels of restoration losses to extract the accomplice’s 
identity feature, and restore the facial image of the accomplice. 
The main contributions are in the following. 
⚫ FD-GAN is proposed to restore the accomplice’s 
facial image without prior knowledge of the morphed 
facial images. To the best of our knowledge, it is the 
first attempt to exploit learning-based generation 
approach for facial image restoration in face 
morphing detection. 
⚫ A symmetric dual network architecture, pixel-level 
and feature-level restoration losses of FD-GAN are 
designed to disentangle the identity features of the 
morphing participants hidden in the morphed facial 
image. 
⚫ Experimental results and analysis illustrate it can 
effectively restore the facial image of the morphing 
accomplice. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The related 
work is introduced in Section II. The proposed FD-GAN is 
described in Section III. Experimental results are provided in 
Section IV. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in Section V. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Currently, the researches related to face morphing are mainly 
concentrated on the vulnerability of FRS to face morphing 
attack and the face morphing detection. 
A.  VULNERABILITY OF FRS TO FACE MORPHING 
ATTACK 
Face morphing attack was first introduced in [2] by M. Ferrera 
et al. With a morphed facial image, which is similar to the 
appearance of multiple persons, it can match with multiple 
persons in FRS. Meanwhile, it indicates that a wanted criminal 
may use a morphed image, which is composited by his own 
facial image and an accomplice’s facial image, to acquire an 
official authority “forged” ID card. However, the morphed 
facial images are manually generated, which is time-
consuming and not suitable for generating large amounts of 
morphing images to verify the vulnerability of FRS. After that, 
an automatic generation of visually faultless facial morphing 
image was proposed in [9]. With this technique, a large 
number of morphed facial images (including complete 
morphing and splicing morphing images) can be generated. 
Furthermore, the quality of the morphed images is verified by 
human observers (including face recognition experts) and a 
commercial-off-the-shelf FRS (Luxand FaceSDK 6.1). 
Recently, D. J. Robertson et al. examined the potential route 
of using facial morphing in fraudulent documents, and found 
that it is possible to forge identity by morphing facial images 
[3]. Meanwhile, M. Gomez-Barrero et al. also confirmed that 
not only face recognition system but also iris and fingerprint 
recognition systems are vulnerable to morphing attack [4], and 
a framework to evaluate the vulnerability of biometric systems 
to morphing attack is proposed. Furthermore, U. Scherhag et 
al. proposed new metrics including mated morph presentation 
match rate (MMPMR) and relative morph match rate (RMMR) 
to evaluate biometric systems’ vulnerability to morphing 
attacks [5]. After that, some other metrics including attack 
presentation classification error rate (APCER) and the bona 
fide presentation classification error rate (BPCER) are 
complemented to evaluate the biometric systems’ 
vulnerability to morphing attacks [6]. In addition, the 
vulnerability of deep learning based FRS to morphing attack 
was investigated in [7], and it is found that morphing attacks 
can degrade the performance of FRS to a certain extent. 
B.  FACE MORPHING DETECTION 
The existing face morphing methods can be divided into two 
categories depending on whether the attack accomplice’s 
facial image can be restored or not, and they are non-restored 
methods and restored methods. Most face morphing detection 
methods belong to the first category. 
1)  NON-RESTORED METHODS 
Considering the texture discrepancy between morphed 
facial image and real facial image, the first work on automated 
face morphing detection was proposed in [8]. The micro-
texture pattern represented by binarized statistical image 
features (BSIF) are extracted for detection. With linear support 
vector machine (SVM) classification, it can achieve good 
detection performance. As the morphed facial image is usually 
generated by the existing real facial images and stored in JPEG 
format, it will cause image quality degradation and JPEG 
artifact. Based on this fact, a morphed face detection method 
based on JPEG compression feature was proposed in [9,10], 
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where the Benford feature extracted from quantized DCT 
coefficients is utilized to detect the morphed facial image. A 
new modeling approach for face morphing attacks was 
proposed by C. Kraetzer et al. [11]. Based on the modeling 
approaches, two different types face morphing attacks as well 
as a forensic morphing detector are implemented and 
evaluated. Eight features including scale invariant feature 
transform (SIFT), speed up robust feature (SURF), oriented 
BRIEF, features from accelerated segment test (FAST), 
adaptive and generic accelerated segment test (AGAST), 
Canny and Sobel edge operators are selected for the detector. 
At the same time, a detection approach for face morphing 
forgeries based on a continuous image JPEG degradation was 
proposed by T. Neubert [12]. It is similar to the method in [11], 
but only SIFT, AGAST and Shi-Tomasi features are used. 
In [13], deep convolutional neural network (D-CNN) 
features were proposed to detect both digital and print-scanned 
morphed facial images. Meanwhile, a morphing attack 
detection approach based on deep learning was proposed in 
[14]. Three current widely-used network architectures are 
investigated, and it is found that the pre-trained VGG19 
network can achieve the best performance among them. 
Recently, L. Debiasi et al. utilized some statistical 
characteristics of sensor pattern noise (SPN) spectrum 
histogram (peak position, peak value, and the product of peak 
position and peak value) to detect face morphing attack [15]. 
It can achieve a fairy good detection performance. At the same 
time, illuminated by the idea of image source identification, a 
face morphing detection method based on SPN was put 
forward by us [16]. The morphed facial image is viewed as a 
computer-generated image, and its SPN is different from that 
of the real facial image. 
2)  RESTORED METHODS 
Different from non-restored methods, restored methods 
usually need an extra auxiliary image captured from FRS. M. 
Ferrara et al. [17] first proposed a method for restoring the 
morphing attack accomplice’s facial image, which is named as 
“face de-morphing”. With an auxiliary image captured from 
FRS and a morphed image stored in the e-passport, it can 
restore the facial image of the accomplice by reversing the 
morphing process. However, it needs some prior knowledge 
about the morphing operation process and the morphing 
parameters of the face morphing. Once an attacker uses other 
morphing operations or the morphing parameters are different 
from the recommended morphing parameters in [17], the 
restored effect will be greatly affected. 
From the above analysis, face morphing detection is an 
emerging technology to protect biometrics. Although some 
work has been done to detect the existence of face morphing 
attack, there still has no reliable approach for restoring the 
facial image of the morphing accomplice.  
In recent years, GAN [18] has been successfully applied in 
various face synthesis related tasks such as photorealistic 
frontal synthesis [19], anti-makeup [20], and identity 
preserving [21]. GAN based face synthesis shows powerful 
advantages in realistic face generation. To countermeasure the 
defects of the existing methods for restoring the morphing 
attack accomplice’s facial image, a face de-morphing 
generative adversarial network FD-GAN is proposed for 
restoring accomplice’s facial image from the perspective of 
learning-based generation in this paper. 
III. The proposed FD-GAN 
To restore the facial image of a morphing accomplice, two 
input facial images are required. One is an image Ia of a 
criminal captured by an FRS, and the other is a morphed facial 
image Iab synthesized from a criminal and an accomplice, 
which is stored in the e-passport system. By using a symmetric 
dual network architecture, FD-GAN can effectually separate 
the morphing accomplice’s identity feature fb from Iab, and the 
accomplice’s facial image Ib1 can be restored by the generator. 
In addition, an adversarial discriminators D is designed to 
distinguish between the real pair images {Ib0, Ib0} and the fake 
(restored) pair images {Ib0, Ib1}. The structure of the proposed 
FD-GAN is depicted in Figure 2, and the symmetric dual 
network architecture, generator and discriminator are 
described in the following.  
 A. THE SYMMETRIC DUAL NETWORK ARCHITECTURE 
Different from the previous GAN-based identity preserved 
face synthesis, the target of this paper is to restore the 
accomplice’s facial image Ib1 with a morphed facial image Iab 
and the criminal’s facial image Ia. Here, a symmetric dual 
network architecture is proposed to accomplish the separation 
of the morphing contributor’s identity. 
As a morphed facial image is generally a synthesis of two 
participants with different identities (e.g. a criminal and an 
accomplice), it is reasonable to assume that the morphed 
image contains the identity characteristics of two contributors 
at the same time, so the morphing contributors’ identity 
recovery operations should be symmetrical. It means that if the 
accomplice’s identity feature fb can be separated from a 
criminal’s facial image Ia and a morphed image Iab, the 
criminal’s identity feature fa also can be separated from the 
same face morphing image Iab and an accomplice’s facial 
image Ib. 
Therefore, the restoration of the morphing contributors 
should have a symmetrical network structure. Unlike Cycle-
GAN [22], which is used for domain-to-domain image style 
conversion by two reciprocal generators, our FD-GAN does 
not deal with the conversion problem from one image domain 
to another, and it has only one generator. 
 Furthermore, in order to guarantee the efficacy of the 
separated identity features, a dual network is intuitively 
considered. Assuming that once an accomplice’s facial image 
Ib1 is restored from Ia and Iab, if this restoration is valid, Ib1 can 
be further used to restore the criminal’s facial image Ia2. In 
other words, with this dual architecture, the latter-level 
generation network can be used to verify the effectiveness of 
the previous-level generation network, and guide the previous-
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level generation network to separate the identity in the right 
way. 
Based on the above, FD-GAN with a symmetric dual 
network architecture is designed, and it is depicted in details 
in Figure 2. 
B.  GENERATOR ARCHITECTURE AND GENERATOR 
LOSS 
In FD-GAN, the generator aims to restore a desirable 
morphing accomplice’s facial image from a morphed facial 
image and a criminal’s facial image. The generator contains 
three parts: 1) an identity encoder network I; 2) an identity 
separation network S; and 3) a facial restoration network R. 
Given a criminal’s facial image Ia and a morphed facial 
image Iab, face alignment is first performed to them, and then 
the identity encoder network I is used to extract the identity 
encoder features fI(Ia0) and fI(Iab0), respectively. It needs to 
mention that the identity encoder feature is different from the 
restored identity feature, e.g. fI(Ib0) is different from fb in 
Figure 2. After that, two identity encoder features are sent to 
the identity separation network S, which is used to separate the 
collaborator’s identity feature. The structure of S is shown in 
Figure 3. The identity coding features fI(Ia0) and fI(Iab0) are 
passed through three residual blocks [23], respectively, and 
then they are concatenated. After another three residual blocks, 
the restored identity feature fb is obtained. Finally, the restored 
facial image Ib1 can be obtained by facial restoration network 
R.  
The details of the identity encoder network I and the facial 
restoration network R are shown in Table I and Table II, 
respectively. For the identity encoder network I, four 
convolution layers are used. Similar to DC-GAN [27], the 
pooling layer are replaced with a strided convolution layer. For 
the facial restoration network R, it is an inverse structure of I. 
The up-sampling layers are used, and the deconvolution layers 
are replaced with convolution layers. The “up-sampling + 
convolution layer” structure can effective suppress the 
“checkerboard” artifact of the traditional de-convolution layer 
in generating images. The ReLU activation is used in network 
I, S, and R. 
 
FIGURE 2.  The overview of FD-GAN. The input/output are drawn with solid lines. The loss functions are drawn with the dashed lines. Blue dashed 
lines represent pixel-level restoration loss, and red dashed lines represent feature-level restoration loss. Network modules with the same color indicate 
that they have the same network structure and share parameters in the training stage. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.  The structure of the identity separation network S. 
 
 
TABLE I 
THE ARCHITECTURE OF IDENTITY ENCODER NETWORK I 
Group Name Configuration (filter/stride) 
Conv1 7 × 7/1 Conv@64 + BN + ReLU 
Conv2 3 × 3/2 Conv@128 + BN + ReLU 
Conv3 3 × 3/2 Conv@256 + BN + ReLU 
Conv4 3 × 3/2 Conv@512 + BN + ReLU 
 
TABLE II 
THE ARCHITECTURE OF FACIAL RESTORATION NETWORK R 
Group 
Name 
Configuration (filter/stride) 
Upconv1 Upsampling + 3 × 3/1 Conv@256 + BN + ReLU 
Upconv2 Upsampling + 3 × 3/1 Conv@128 + BN + ReLU 
Upconv3 Upsampling + 3 × 3/1 Conv@64 + BN + ReLU 
Upconv4 7 × 7/1 Conv@3 + Tanh 
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 The generator receives three kinds of losses for updating 
parameters: pixel-level restoration loss Lpxl, feature-level 
restoration loss Lf and adversarial loss Ladv. The generator’s 
total loss is 
 1 2G pxl f advL L L L = + + ,         (1) 
where 1 2,   represent the weights of the corresponding 
losses, respectively. 
1)  PIXEL-LEVEL RESTORATION LOSS 
The pixel-level restoration loss Lpxl is composed of two 
parts: pixel-wise loss Lpix and symmetry loss Lsym, and it is 
defined as 
 1pxl pix symL L L= + ,             (2) 
where 1  represents the weight of symmetry loss Lsym. 
Pixel-wise loss Lpix continuously pushes the restored facial 
image to the ground truth as close as possible. Considering that 
our proposed FD-GAN uses a symmetric dual network 
architecture during training stage, there are four pairs of pixel-
wise losses Lpb1, Lpb2, Lpa1, and Lpa2. They are defined as 
 1 2 1 2pix pb pb pa paL L L L L= + + + ,  (3) 
 1 0
1 1pb b b
L I I= − ,  (4) 
 2 0
2 1pb b b
L I I= − , (5) 
 1 0
1 1pa a a
L I I= − , (6) 
 2 0
2 1pa a a
L I I= − , (7) 
where 
1 0 0( , )b a abI G I I= , 
1 0 0( , )a b abI G I I= , 
2 0 0 0( ( , ), )b b ab abI G G I I I=  , 
2 0 0 0( ( , ), )a a ab abI G G I I I= , ( , )G  
represents the generator of FD-GAN, and 
1
represents L1-
norm. 
As symmetry is a prominent characteristic of human face, 
it is taken into account as a constraint to guarantee the 
rationality of the restored face. Similarly, there also have 
four symmetry losses 1
bsymI
L , 2
bsymI
L , 1
asymI
L  , and 2
asymI
L , and 
they are defined as 
 1 2 1 2
b b a a
sym symI symI symI symI
L L L L L= + + + ,  (8) 
 1
1 1
, , 1 1
1 1
1
( ) ( )
/ 2b
h w
sym b i j b i w jI
i j
L I I
h w
− +
= =
= −

 ,  (9) 
 2
2 2
, , 1 1
1 1
1
( ) ( )
/ 2b
h w
sym b i j b i w jI
i j
L I I
h w
− +
= =
= −

 ,  (10) 
 1
1 1
, , 1 1
1 1
1
( ) ( )
/ 2a
h w
sym a i j a i w jI
i j
L I I
h w
− +
= =
= −

 ,  (11) 
 2
2 2
, , 1 1
1 1
1
( ) ( )
/ 2a
h w
sym a i j a i w jI
i j
L I I
h w
− +
= =
= −

 ,  (12) 
2)  FEATURE-LEVEL RESTORATION LOSS 
Besides pixel-level restoration losses, there still has feature-
level restoration loss. For the proposed symmetrical dual 
network architecture, the restored identity features in each 
stage should be as consistent as possible. There are two pairs 
of feature-level restoration losses Lfa and Lfb, and they are 
defined as 
 f fa fbL L L= + ,  (13) 
 '
1fa a a
L f f= − ,  (14) 
 '
1fb b b
L f f= −  . (15) 
3)  ADVERSARIAL LOSS 
The adversarial loss of the generator for distinguishing the 
real pair facial images {Ib0, Ib0} from the fake (restored) pair 
facial images {Ib0, Ib1} is calculated as 
 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 2
( ), ( ), ( )
[( ( , ) 1) ]
b b a a ab ab
adv b bI P I I P I I P I
L D I I
  
= − ,  (16) 
where ( , )D   represents the discriminator of FD-GAN. 
C.  DISCRIMINATOR ARCHITECTURE AND LOSS 
Different from the traditional GAN discriminators, the 
discriminator of FD-GAN determines both the real pair 
facial images {Ib0, Ib0} and the restored pair facial images {Ib0, 
Ib1}. The details of discriminator D are shown in Table III. In 
the network D, three convolution layers are used, and the 
Leaky ReLU activation is used in network D. 
The discriminator requires that the restored facial image Ib1 
should like a real facial image, and it should belong to the same 
identity as Ib0. Here, LS-GAN [24] loss instead of the negative 
log likelihood, which was used in the original GAN, is used. 
The discriminator loss is defined as 
 
0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 2
( )
0 1 2
( ), ( ), ( )
[( ( , ) 1) ]
[( ( , )) ]
b b
b b a a ab ab
D b bI P I
b bI P I I P I I P I
L D I I
D I I

  
= − +
 . (17) 
IV. Experiments and Analysis 
As there is no publicly available facial image dataset for face 
morphing detection, we built a face morphing database (FM-
database) and then it is used to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the proposed FD-GAN. 
A.  THE SETUP OF THE FM-DATABASE 
The FM-database contains 63 subjects (27 females and 36 
males). It is divided into three disjoint subsets: training set, 
development set and testing set, and they consist of 28, 7 and 
28 subjects, respectively. All subjects were photographed 
twice with an interval of one week and 10~12 frontal images 
were taken each time. Thus, there are about 23 images for 
TABLE III 
THE ARCHITECTURE OF DISCRIMINATOR NETWORK D 
Group Name Configuration (filter/stride) 
Conv1 3 × 3/2 Conv@64 + Leaky ReLU 
Conv2 3 × 3/2 Conv@128 + BN + Leaky ReLU 
Conv3 3 × 3/2 Conv@256 + BN + Leaky ReLU 
FC1 Fully Connected Layer+ Sigmoid 
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each of 63 subjects. One image with ideal quality of each 
subject is chosen for creating morphed facial images and the 
rest are used to construct the bona fide facial images (with a 
total of 1378 images). The facial images of all subjects are 
captured by Canon 550D SLR camera following the ICAO 
guidelines on eMRTD. To guarantee the disjoint nature of 
the database as mentioned above, the morphed facial images 
are independently generated in training, development, and 
testing set. In each subset, face morphing images are 
automatically generated according to the workflow proposed 
in [9].  
To effectively evaluate the validity of the FM database, a 
commercial FRS Megvii Face++ Compare API [25] is 
exploited. A successful morphing attack to the FRS is 
defined that both subjects of the morphed image can be 
successfully accepted by the system [2]. It means that each 
morphed facial image needs to be compared with the images 
of all subjects, which are contributed to the morphing process. 
By using Face++, the Compare API requires to be called 
twice, and only two returned scores are both greater than the 
recommended threshold can the morphed facial image be 
considered to be a successful face morphing attack. The 
recommended threshold of Face++ Compare API is 62.37 
when FAR is 0.1% (FRONTEX recommends that the 
operation point of FRS in border control scenarios is at 
FAR=0.1%).  
Finally, 1378 morphed facial images (with various fusion 
factors) that successfully attack the Face++ are collected into 
the FM-database. Among them, 584 morphed facial images 
are used for restoration testing.  
B.  IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS 
In order to make the training phase effective, all the input 
images are aligned according to 5 facial landmarks by using 
dlib programming library [26]. Each facial image is resized 
to 128 × 128 × 3 pixels, and the restored facial images from 
the generator are of the same size. 
The FD-GAN is implemented using the deep learning 
toolbox Tensorflow 1.11.0 [28]. For the loss weights, they 
are empirically set as λ1 = 10, λ2 = 1 and 1 = 1. 
C.  EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In the experiments, two scenarios are considered. The first is 
the ideal scenario. The template facial images are used to 
generate the morphing facial images, and each of them is 
obtained as an auxiliary image for training and testing. The 
purpose is to verify the feasibility of the proposed FD-GAN. 
The second is the real application scenario. The facial images 
captured by FRS are used for training and testing, which may 
contain various expression, make-up and occlusion. 
1)  ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
For the first scenario, an ablation study is performed. 
Different loss combinations and without use of symmetric 
dual network are done to the FD-GAN to evaluate its 
performance. Here, four variations of FD-GAN are compared, 
and they are 1) removing the loss Lpix (denoted as w/o Lpix); 2) 
removing the loss Lf (denoted as w/o Lf); 3) removing the loss 
Lsym (denoted as w/o Lsym); and 4) training without symmetric 
dual network architecture (denoted as w/o SDN). The 
visualization samples of each variant are shown in Figure 4. 
Where GT represents the ground truth of the accomplice Ib0, 
and Ib0, Iab0 represent the criminal facial image and morphed 
facial image, respectively. As expected, FD-GAN including 
all losses achieves the best visual effects. Without the loss Lpix, 
it is almost impossible to generate the real facial images. 
Without symmetric dual network architecture, the restored 
facial images are obviously different from the ground truth. 
After removing the loss Lf, the restored facial images are also 
different from the ground truth, but there is a little 
improvement comparing with those without symmetrical 
structure network. When the loss Lsym is removed, the facial 
asymmetry is apparent in nostrils and eyes’ size. 
To quantitatively evaluate the performance of FD-GAN, 
Face++ is used to compare the restored facial image Ib1 with 
Ib0 and Ia0, respectively. When the system determines that Ib1 
matches Ib0 but it does not match Ia0, the restoration is regarded 
as successful. The restoration accuracy is defined as 
 
FIGURE 4.  Restoration results of FD-GAN and its variants. 
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 ,
N
Accuracy
T
=   (18) 
where N represents the number of successfully restored 
facial images, and T represents the total number of restored 
facial images.  
The restoration accuracy of scenario 1 is listed in Table IV. 
For the second scenario, the same hyper-parameters (loss 
weight and learning rate etc.) of the first scenario are used for 
simplicity. Some synthetic samples are illustrated in Figure 6, 
and the restoration accuracy is listed in Table V. 
Comparing the results listed in Table IV and Table V, the 
restoration accuracy of the second scenario is much lower than 
that of the first situation. This is mainly because the facial 
images captured by FRS in the second situation have more 
variants in expression, make-up, occlusion, etc. Therefore, it 
is more difficult to restore the face morphing accomplice.  
2)  PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed 
scheme, the proposed FD-GAN is also compared with the 
latest face de-morphing method [17] in two scenarios (The de-
morphing parameter was selected as 0.3, which is 
recommended in [17]). The restoration accuracy is listed in 
Table VI, and some synthetic samples are also illustrated in 
Figure 5 and Figure 6.  
From Table VI, it can be found that the accuracy of 
restoring accomplice’s facial image of the proposed method 
outperforms that of the method in [17]. In scenario 1, FD-
GAN achieve the best restored accuracy 85.97%, while the 
method [17] is only 49.82%. As seen from Figure 5 and Figure 
6, the restored facial images with the method in [17] have 
different degrees of restoration defects, such as abnormal color 
spots, edge artifacts, etc. The most obvious is that in the last 
four examples in Figure 5. The restored facial images are 
almost the same as the morphed facial images, and the facial 
images of the accomplices are not effectively recovered. The 
main reason is that the method in [17] relies on the prior 
knowledge of the generation of the morphed face, such as the 
morphing process and the morphing parameters. In this 
experiment, the varied morphing parameters are used in 
morphed facial image generation, which leads to limited 
restoration performance. It also indicates that the method in 
[17] is sensitive to the prior knowledge and not suitable for 
practical applications. However, the proposed FD-GAN 
doesn’t rely on any prior knowledge of the generation of the 
morphed face, and it realizes the accomplice’s facial 
restoration by separating the identity of the accomplice hidden 
in morphed facial images. 
TABLE IV 
THE RESTORATION ACCURACY WITH ABLATION IN SCENARIO 1 
Method w/o Lpix w/o SDN w/o Lf w/o Lsym FD-GAN 
Accuracy - 45.55% 49.32% 79.11% 85.97% 
 
TABLE V 
THE RESTORATION ACCURACY WITH ABLATION IN SCENARIO 2 
Method w/o Lpix w/o SDN w/o Lf w/o Lsym FD-GAN 
Accuracy - 33.56% 49.82% 61.13% 64.90% 
 
 
FIGURE 5.  Example of restoration comparison in scenario 1. 
 
TABLE VI 
THE RESTORATION ACCURACY COMPARISON IN TWO SCENARIOS 
Method Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Face de-morphing [17] 49.82% 46.91% 
FD-GAN (Proposed) 85.97% 64.90% 
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The experimental results show the superiority of the 
proposed FD-GAN of its symmetric dual structure. In addition, 
since all morphed images used in the experiments can 
successfully spoof Face++, the implementation of FD-GAN 
can significantly reduce the possibility of successful face 
morphing attack and further restore the accomplice’s facial 
image. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a FD-GAN is proposed to restore the face 
morphing accomplice’s facial image. To the best of our 
knowledge, it is the first work to restore the face morphing 
accomplice’s facial image using learning-based generation 
approach. The symmetric dual network is specially designed 
to effectively disentangle the identity features of the morphing 
participants. Experimental results demonstrate that the 
proposed FD-GAN can achieve fairly good restoration 
performance. Our future work will be concentrated on 
improving the morphing contributor’s facial restoration 
accuracy involving expression, posture, make-up and 
occlusion variants. 
APPENDIX 
AUTOMATIC FACE MORPHING PROCESS 
According to the workflow of [1], the general steps for 
automatic generation of the morphed facial image are as 
follows. 
Step 1. Locate the key points of the morphed facial image. 
Given two facial images I1 and I2, K1 and K2 are the locations 
of the corresponding facial landmarks. Then the location KM 
of the key points of the morphed facial image can be calculated 
as  
 1 2(1 ) ,MK K K = − +  (19) 
where  represents a location fusion factor. 
To avoid the failure of morphing face generation, 85 
landmarks are used for generating morphed facial image, as 
shown in Figure 7. Among them, 68 facial landmarks are 
localized by using dlib programming library [26]. However, 
three facial landmarks depicting the lower contour of the upper 
lip are omitted, because they may result in morphing errors. 
The other 20 landmarks added on the image borders are used 
for triangulation in the outer region of the convex hull, which 
is composed by 65 facial landmarks. With the help of facial 
landmark points of both contributing images, a morphed facial 
image using triangulation based tight morphing is generated. 
Step 2. Warping. Triangular mesh TM can be derived from 
KM via Delaunay triangulation. Similarly, two triangular mesh 
T1 and T2 can also be derived from K1 and K2, respectively. For 
each triangle in T1, all pixels inside the triangle are transformed 
to the corresponding triangle in TM by affine transform, and 
then the warped image I1' from I1 is obtained. Similarly, the 
warped image I2' from I2 can be also obtained. 
Step 3. Blending. A morphed facial image IM can be 
obtained as 
 ( ) 1 21MI I I  = − + , (20) 
  
FIGURE 7.  Example of facial landmarks and corresponding Delaunay 
triangles (green and blue landmarks are localized by dlib, blue 
landmarks are removed, and red points are additional landmarks (red). 
 
 
FIGURE 6.  Example of restoration comparison in scenario 2 (auxiliary images contain expression, make-up and occlusion changes). 
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where  represents a pixel fusion factor.  
In the experiments, the pixel fusion factor  is varied from 
0.1 to 0.9, and the location fusion factor   is fixed as 0.5. 
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